This paper develops a model of preemptive jump bidding in common value takeover auctions. It shows that in a case of common values jump bidding increases the social surplus, and, under certain conditions, can lead to higher expected seller's revenue. It also demonstrates that an increase in...

This paper provides an analysis of takeover auctions in which target firms actively participate by changing their reserve prices. It considers a takeover auction as an affiliated-value English auction with flexible reserve price and discusses how the degree of value affiliation affects the...

This paper provides an explanation for the widespread use of stock option grants in executive compensation. It shows that the optimal incentive contract for loss-averse managers must contain a substantial portion of stock options even when it should consist exclusively of stock grants for...

This paper investigates implications of some of the well-known behavioral biases of bidders' behavior in different types of auctions. It presents the results of an experimental study that tests the endowment hypothesis for English auctions and regret aversion hypothesis for first-price...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study aimed to understand how the past stock performance affects investor's desire to buy or sell the stock. It shows that people prefer to buy stocks that performed well in the past. However, when investors must sell one of the stocks they...

This paper argues that the presence of both profit-based and stock price-based components in compensation contracts provides senior managers the incentive to optimally allocate effort to both implementing previously devised strategies that provide current profits and to formulating new...