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Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013

Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224783

The incentive impact of the fixed wage : a real effort experiment

Manthei, Kathrin; Mohnen, Alwine - In: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung : ZfP 27 (2013) 4, pp. 331-353

on Pokorny (2008) we firstly analyze the impact of the fixed wage on work performance within a linear incentive contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010386873

The heterogeneous effects of bonus pay on performance outcomes : evidence from personnel data ; conference paper

Sauermann, Jan - 2014

This study uses rich information on performance outcomes to estimate the effect of bonus pay on worker productivity. We use a policy discontinuity in the call centre of a multi-national telephone company in which management introduced monetary bonuses upon achieving pre-defined performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489250

Paid to quit

Dur, Robert A. J.; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405134

Ironing Out the Kinks in Executive Compensation : Linking Incentive Pay to Average Stock Prices

Tian, Yisong S. - 2012

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal …-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among … other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100690

The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay : Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation

Williams, Kelli Alces - 2013

-like incentive compensation, sometimes called “inside debt,” as a way of controlling risk-taking in systemically important financial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091180

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures

Bansal, Naresh - 2014

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066564

Real Earnings Smoothing and Managerial Compensation Incentives

Chen, Changling - 2019

' incentive of increasing R&D investment of high risk in nature) and the sensitivity of executive wealth to a unit change in stock … price (delta, capturing executives' incentive of preserving stock price possibly through reducing R&D investment). Given the … risk-taking incentive of executives, and find evidence supporting our hypothesis that the real smoothing is less for firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894937

Payday Before Mayday : CEO Compensation Contracting for Distressed Firms

Carter, Mary Ellen - 2020

Using a sample of more than 1,500 US public firms in the period 1998-2016, we examine how firms endogenously adjust CEO compensation contracts when they become financially distressed. The link between compensation and equity-based measures of firm performance is positive and strong prior to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851901

CEO compensation : evidence from the field

Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021

and incentive compatibility. These constraints lead to lower pay levels and more one-size-fits-all structures … view intrinsic motivation and reputation as stronger motivators than incentive pay. They believe pay matters to CEOs not to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217