The aim of this paper is to test the relevance of considering private fixed transaction costs for contract design of Agri-Environmental Schemes, when transaction costs are negatively correlated to marginal compliance costs. In order to do so, a principal-agent model of contract design under...

We extend the principal/one-agent model with countervailing incentives to a framework in which the principal deals with two agents behaving non-cooperatively and protected by limited liability. Focusing on the two-type case, we show that, beside the situation in which first best is effected even...

We consider a principal who deals with two privately informed agents protected by limited liability. Their technologies are such that the fixed costs decline with the marginal costs (the types), which are correlated. Because of these technological features, agents display countervailing...

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With internationally mobile labour and the abolition of national border controls, the individual may not only have private information about his skill level (adverse selection), but also about the length of time he resides and works in the home country (moral hazard) and about his foreign...