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We establish the precise connections between progressive taxation and inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is exogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835252
In this paper we explore the implications of fundamental principles for the evaluation of population health. We formalize those principles as axioms for social preferences over dis- tributions of health for a given population. We single out several focal population health evaluation functions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212236
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004727
Abstract We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870822
We explore in this paper the implications of ethical and operational principles for the evaluation of population health. We formalize those principles as axioms for social preferences over distributions of health for a given population. We single out several focal population health evaluation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322850
This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752111