one of the two states. We elicit subjects’ beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to … subject’s own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the majority of …, it can be rationalized by accounting for elicited beliefs and other-regarding preferences. Finally, the honest behavior …

one of the two states. We elicit subjects' beliefs, risk and other-regarding preferences. Our design also allows us to … subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive … elicited beliefs and other-regarding preferences. Finally, the honest behavior of some senders can be explained by other …

feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for …

by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …

than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …. -- strategic ignorance ; bargaining ; intentions ; experiment …

by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …

rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …

receiver in an information transmission game. We also elicit the subjects' beliefs of others' strategic behavior, risk and … other-regarding preferences. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive strategies by … predictions). However, it can be rationalized by accounting for beliefs (68 percent of subjects behave consistently with their own …