will not want to disclose match information. If legal, the low-quality firm rival would like to advertise match information … consume the low quality product: this effect can dominate the benefits from improved consumer information and reduce social …Consumer information on products affects competition and profits. We analyze firms' decisions to impart product …

Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better matching but also higher prices, so … more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This is when comparative advertising is used, against a large firm by … a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more information, therefore helps consumers. While it also improves …

facing a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes regarding product quality and brand image. First, we analyze …

quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is … information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price … necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower-quality firms need to provide more …

quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is … information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price … necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower quality firms need to provide more …

dissuade entry tomorrow, and that her product has a high quality in order to attract consumers in the current period. The …

) industry. I present an empirical discrete-choice model of limited information on the part of consumers, where advertising …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

entrant signals its product quality. By a comparative ad the entrant refers to the incumbent's product. We show that …