We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities arenot observed by the econometrician. First, we adapt the denition ofidentiability to a framework with anonymous bids and we explore theextent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify privatevalue auction models. Second,...

We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a supersetof combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packagesthat are contingent on the whole nal assignment. Without externalities,the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction areboth robust if items are perceived as...

We analyse a unique data set on multi-unit ascending auctions,which contains the whole dynamic of bidders' behavior in the IFAauctionsselling the right to use the electric transmission capacity betweenFrance and England. First, we document that daily auctionssuer from a great extent of...

We slightly modify the Ausubel-Milgrom [3] Proxy Auction byadding a nal stage which possibly induces some discounts relativeto the nal accepted bids of the 'original' auction. The proxy auctionwith nal discounts is such that the outcome is a point in the bidderoptimal frontier of the Core. Then...

The analysis of second price auctions with externalities is utterly modified if the seller is unable to commit not to participate in the mechanism. For the General Symmetric Model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica 50...

The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids...

We consider standard auction models when bidders’ identities are not–or are only partially–observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying...

We introduce contingent auction mechanisms, which is a superset of combinatorial auctions, and where bidders submit bids on packages that are contingent on the whole final assignment. Without externalities, the Vickrey and the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction are both robust if items are perceived...

From a theory viewpoint, the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions, or the use of auctions with secret reserve prices is somehow puzzling despite being common. By allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation...