Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms to select the best among them. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate...

We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that...

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus,...

We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism...

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....

Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...

In many market-design applications, a new mechanism is introduced to reform an existing institution. Compared to the design of a mechanism in isolation, the presence of a status-quo system introduces both challenges and opportunities for the designer. We study this problem in the context of...

Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures Series List -- Contents -- About the Arne Ryde Foundation -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Sequential Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects -- 3 Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects -- 4 The Stochastic and Dynamic Knapsack Model -- 5...