Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

transparency of hospital quality information increased substantially due to the disclosure of hospitals’ quality indicators. We …We examine the impact of competition on outcome and process indicators of hospital quality. While earlier literature on … the relationship between competition and hospital quality mainly focused on outcome indicators, we argue that the …

Firms normally disclose quality information to consumers using two alternative formats: either directly to consumers or … indirectly through downstream retailers. This study investigates optimal disclosure strategies/formats in a channel setting with … bilateral monopolies. It shows that retail disclosure leads to more equilibrium information revelation. This is because the …

such communication is that it takes on one of two alternative forms when quality is exogenous: 1) disclosure of quality …Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising … through a credible direct claim; 2) signaling of quality via producer actions that influence buyersÕ beliefs about quality. In …

lower full marginal cost. We characterize the firm�s equilibrium disclosure and pricing behavior, and compare that … behavior and the associated welfare to what would occur under a regime of mandatory disclosure. We derive a range of disclosure … costs that would induce a high-safety firm to choose disclosure over signaling. When the firm�s full marginal cost is …