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Using a large-scale hybrid laboratory and online trust experiment with and without pre-play communication, we investigate how the passage of time affects trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. Communication (predominantly through promises) raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by...
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How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080038
Using a high-stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103518
Consumer search is not only costly but also tiring. We characterize the intertemporal effects that search fatigue has on oligopoly prices, product proliferation, and the provision of consumer assistance (i.e., advice). These effects vary based on whether search is all-or-nothing or sequential in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109854
Using a high-stakes field experiment conducted with a financial brokerage, we implement a novel design to separately identify two channels of social influence in financial decisions, both widely studied theoretically. When someone purchases an asset, his peers may also want to purchase it, both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065867
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013481878
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238760