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Let's talk: How communication affects contract design
Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary; Ellman, Matthew - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2012
shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent … and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts … inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554806
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How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)'s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282296
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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874
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Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
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Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333816
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Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427633
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Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316921
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Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319469
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Reference points in renegotiations : the role of contracts and competition
Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571567
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Can contracts signal social norms? : experimental evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765609