While often criticized, independence remains the ultimate criterion for evaluating board composition, whether for regulators or shareholder activists. In this study, we examine the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in a panel of French listed companies,...

The paper investigates the determinants of bank board structure in Ghana and finds that the Scope of Operations Hypothesis could explain the variation in board size but not board independence. On the other hand, the Board Monitoring Hypothesis could only explain the variation in board...

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the main studies that have investigated the connections between managerial ownership, board aracteristics and firm’s performance. It discusses the methodological approaches used in researching the ownership’s structure –...

Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts...

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the main studies that have investigated the connections between managerial ownership, board aracteristics and firm’s performance. It discusses the methodological approaches used in researching the ownership’s structure –...

We examine the prevalence and performance impact of controlling shareholders and study corporate board structures and ownership structures in 1796 Indian firms. Families (founders) are present on the boards in 63.2 (65.5) percent of the sample firms. On average, founders own over 50% of...

One of the most controversial issues in corporate governance is whether the CEO of a corporation should also serve as chairman of the board. In theory, an independent board chair improves the ability of the board to oversee management. However, an independent chairman is not unambiguously...

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’...

In three self-contained essays, this dissertation deals with the impact of board structure on firm performance and with determinants of executive compensation, director compensation, and payout policy. Each of the three chapters is based on panel data sets of German firms. Distinguishing...