Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationalityof the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative.When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost,the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are...

Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affrmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...

The paper discusses the reasons for supporting international trade finance during a liquidity crisis. Targeted interventions are justified when prices are rigid and sellers insist on immediate payment due to fears of strategic default. In this case, buyers who reject the seller's offer fail to...