To understand how firms create and maintain long term relationships with consumers, or how procurement relations evolve over time, it is useful to study a dynamic variant of the classical two-type-buyer contract in mechanism design. It is less trivial and more interesting if the utility...

We examine a hierarchical model where a principal hires a risk averse supervisor to monitor the e ort exerted by a productive agent. We assume that the supervisor can misreport the collected evidence without incurring any cost. We develop a corruption-proof contract which makes it sequentially...

Effective project coordination and management of time and cost scheduling in public funded construction projects receive a considerable focus from academics, politicians, and the construction industry itself with opposing points of view. The study objective is therefore to investigate the...

The last financial crisis revealed anomalies in corporate ability to face adverse economic conditions and fast exchange of new developments. Relying mostly on accounting data for budgetary cost control, the Management found that the data, although fiscally correct and valid for strategic...