We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is “connected” to a set of contests and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under the Tullock contest success function and explore how behavior...

We present evidence of cheating that took place in online examinations during COVID-19 lockdowns and propose two solutions with and without a camera for the cheating problem based on the experience accumulated by online chess communities over the past two decades. The best implementable solution...

In this paper we model an evolutionary process with perpetual random shocks, where individuals sample population-specific strategy and payoff realizations and imitate the most successful behavior. For finite n-player games we prove that in the limit, as the perturbations tend to zero, only...

This dissertation consists of three chapters where the first two chapters study models ofbargaining over decision rights and the third chapter studies a model of contests.In the first chapter, "Selling Authority," I consider bargaining over decision-making authorityin which an informed but...

In the first chapter, ¡°All-Pay Auctions with Resale¡±, I study equilibria of first- and second-price all-pay auctions with resale when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. I show that existence of resale possibilities introduces an endogenous element to players'...

This dissertation consists of three essays, the first two on the foreign exchange market and the third on credit markets.Chapter 2 examines empirically the exchange rateinterest differential relationship in a co-integration framework. We test and estimate an error correction model (ECM) for the...