We investigate the role of marital patterns in explaining rising income inequality using a structural marriage matching …

We investigate the role of marital patterns in explaining rising income inequality using a structural marriage matching …

We investigate how job displacement affects whom men marry and study implications for marriage market matching theory … if matched with low-earning women and to re-match with higher earning women. We use a general search and matching model … substitutes rather than complements in the marriage market; (ii) our findings are hard to reconcile with one-dimensional matching …

We investigate how job displacement affects whom men marry and study implications for marriage market matching theory … if matched with low-earning women and to re-match with higher earning women. We use a general search and matching model … substitutes rather than complements in the marriage market; (ii) our findings are hard to reconcile with one-dimensional matching …

matching market offerscontracts. I show that when expected marital surplus is strictly monotonic in agents’types, no … separating equilibrium that achieves matching efficiency exists. I then studya social planner’s problem, finding necessary and … sufficient conditions for a truthful directrevelation mechanism to achieve matching efficiency. These conditions become …

population, particularly among the youth. We estimate a multidimensional matching model of the marriage market where partner …

We embed a two-sided matching market with non-transferable utility, a marriage market, into a random search model. We … matchings for the underlying marriage market. We show that this is the case if and only if there is a unique stable matching …. Otherwise, the set of limit matchings contains the set of all stable deterministic matchings, but also contains unstable random …

stable. In particular, stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We show …

An important paper by Chiappori et al. (2012) has proposed an elegant and parsimonious model of spousal matching over …

. Stability means that the marriage matching is individually rational and has no blocking pairs. We characterize stable marriage …