We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...

This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage. Under specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover. In addition, aggregate demand...

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R1">Ausubel's (2004)</xref> and yields the same outcome as <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R12">Perry and Reny's...</xref>

We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal...

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.