The relationship between the financial structure of marketing cooperatives and the requirement of the domination of control by the members of the cooperative is analysed with an emphasis on incomplete contracts and system complementarities. It is argued that the disappearance of shortage markets...

The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favorable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision...

Co-operatives play a major role in the agricultural and food industry. Co-operatives, by the very nature, are producer-oriented firms. As market conditions for food products have changed in recent decades, the question is raised whether co-operatives are still efficient organisations for...

Changes in the market conditions for fruit and vegetables have induced Dutch co-operative auctions to restructure their sales and marketing activities. Nine auctions merged into VTN and established the marketing organisation The Greenery International BV. VTN/The Greenery have encountered many...

The nature of organizational change and the value of headquarters is analyzed in a dynamic bargaining model. Organizational change can be either imposed, or voluntary and immediate, or voluntary and delayed. Headquarters derives it value from preventing surplus reducing endogenous commitments.

This article addresses the impact of governance structure on diversification behavior. Hypotheses are developed regarding the differences in diversification strategy of cooperatives and stock listed companies. The analysis shows that stock listed companies are more diversified than cooperatives,...

In the 1950s and 1960s there was a debate about the nature of an agricultural cooperative: the cooperative as extension of the farm, the cooperative as vertical integration or the cooperative as a firm. We revisit this debate with various concepts from the theory of the firm that have been...

This article addresses the influence costs problem in the governance structure ‘agribusiness cooperative.’ Influence costs are higher in cooperatives than in investor-oriented firms due to the unique governance structure of the former. Hypotheses are formulated and tested regarding...

We empirically examine the determinants of the allocation of decision rights in the context of fruit and vegetable contracting. The main conclusion is that under contract farming, many decision rights are shifted from farmers to firms. Quality, reputation and specific investments by firms...

Marketing co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of a MC is a threat to the survival of a MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing....