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productive, or near equally productive employees without relational contracts.  Investment in specific training relaxes the … incentive constraints on relational contracts, so the optimal level of investment can be higher for those with a relational … additional cost of optimal investment precisely offsets the post-investment surplus for marginal employees in relational …
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Soziale Integration ist der Schlüssel für nachhaltige Entwicklung! Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage nach dem Gegensatz von Wachstums- und Verteilungszielen. Die theoretische Analyse betont die Rolle kultureller Diffusion. Die neue Antwort ist von großer wirtschaftspolitischer Relevanz:...
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We introduce a new suite of macroeconomic models that extend and complement the Debt, Investment, and Growth (DIG …'s properties by analyzing the growth, debt, and distributional consequences of big-push public investment programs with different … mixes of investment in human capital and infrastructure. We show that investment in human capital is much more effective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828060
We introduce a new suite of macroeconomic models that extend and complement the Debt, Investment, and Growth (DIG …'s properties by analyzing the growth, debt, and distributional consequences of big-push public investment programs with different … mixes of investment in human capital and infrastructure. We show that investment in human capital is much more effective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012252029
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privately observedagent types that are persistent over time. For a sufficiently productive relationship,a pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationshipchoose the same action. Necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701819
This paper extends the relational contract model in Levin (2003) with shocks to theagent’s cost of effort (agent’s type) to shocks to the principal’s valuation of the agent’seffort (principal’s type). When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133036