Similar Search Results

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2012

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878385

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

Mutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247858

Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games

Dagan, Nir; Serrano, Roberto - Nir Dagan - 1998

equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357964

Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

Koczy, Laszlo A. - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693818

Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 2004

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704188

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

Serrano, Roberto - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1996

implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby … cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772396

Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003

Serrano, Roberto - In: Investigaciones Economicas 29 (2005) 2, pp. 219-258

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005813655

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543232