Similar Search Results

Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336

Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

Kóczy, László Á. - 2012

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494524

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - 2009

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279466

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878385

Profit-maximizing matchmaker

Ko, Chiu Yu; Konishi, Hideo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 217-232

This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049796

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2009

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, GEB, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103287

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Investigaciones Economicas 26 (2002) 2, pp. 285-298

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690062