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A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516

Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

Kóczy, László Á. - 2012

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494524

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - 2009

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279466

Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - Department of Economics and Finance Research and … - 2004

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704188

Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003

Serrano, Roberto - In: Investigaciones Economicas 29 (2005) 2, pp. 219-258

This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005813655

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

Serrano, Roberto - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1996

implementation. This is done through a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibility problems, thereby … cooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of most cooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772396

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543232

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2009

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, GEB, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103287

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Investigaciones Economicas 26 (2002) 2, pp. 285-298

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690062