The paper reviews the corporate governance from his evolution point of view. The used perspective is a discussion between convergence and divergence in corporate governance of financial intermediaries. The discussion is core for researches in scientific and implementation papers for last fifty...

Kathryn Judge of Columbia University documents how financial intermediaries persistently impose high fees compared to the value rendered, attributes this to political influence, and suggests countervailing policy strategies, including stoking competition and enhancing disclosure to reduce...

A focal point in strategic and regulatory debates about the pros and cons of diversification among financial institutions continues to be the issue of economies of scope in financial intermediation. In this paper, we summarize the theoretical research on the value of diversification in financial...

This paper investigates whether geographic diversification is value-enhancing or value-destroying in the financial services sector, broadly defined. Our dataset comprises approximately 3579 observations over the period from 1985 to 2004 and covers the entire range of U.S. financial...

The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the level of compensation...

Hong Kong leads the rank tables as an international financial centre. However, the data indicate that some parts of her corporate governance arrangements probably detract from - rather than contribute to - that leading position. In this brief, we show how excessive shareholding concentration,...

We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine boththe corporate governance structure and the division of profits betweenhuman and financial capital. In a democratic society where financialwealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restraingovernance by dispersed...