We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

We propose an agency model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes (equilibria) of this market. In this...

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...

We analyse a model of two-sided matching and incentive contracts where expertinvestors (venture capitalists) with different monitoring capacities are matched withfirms with different levels of initial wealth. Firms do not have sufficient start-upcapital to cover their project costs and hence,...

We analyse a (differentiated good) industry where an incumbent firm owns a networkgood (essential input) and faces potential competition in the (downstream) retailmarket. Unlike the traditional approach, we consider a scenario where the decision tocompete or not in the downstream segment is...