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, strategy-proofness, and unanimity, with and without anonymity, are decomposable on non-dictatorial single-peaked voting domains. …Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two …, strategy-proofness, unanimity, and feasibility together are not totally unimodular in collective choice environments in general …
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We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...
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