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This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation … coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open … membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591895
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation … coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open … membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423070
We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model … comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability … concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325097
We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model … comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability … concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324941
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071763
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation … coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open … membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075305
Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732219
Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941040