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Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2004

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Ehlers, Lars - 2013

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208561

Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2013

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208606

Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control

Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2013

restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the … specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208614

An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - 2014

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208702

Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - 2016

The member states of the European Union received 1.2 million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to 2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful integration remain. This paper focuses on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208761

Dynamic Refugee Matching

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Martinello, Alessandro - 2018

Asylum seekers are often assigned to a locality in their host country directly upon arrival based on some type of uninformed dynamic matching system which does not take the background of the asylum seekers into consideration. This paper proposes an informed, intuitive, easy-to-implement and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208807

Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; … - 2021

We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategyproofness, constrained efficiency, weak...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208817

Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools

Andersson, Tommy; Dur, Umut; Ertemel, Sinan; Kesten, Onur - 2018

-stage admission system with public and private schools. To perform the analysis, relevant axioms and equilibrium notions need to be … a straightforward (i.e., truthful) equilibrium and non-wastefulness. Given this insight, we identify the unique set of … rules for two-stage admission systems that guarantees the existence of a straightforward equilibrium and, at the same time …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208839

An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars - 2021

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208893