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Determinants of employment in the ministerial bureaucracy
Brändle, Thomas - 2012
Senior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity and …-profile occupational group from a political economics perspective. We analyze how political partisanship, political patronage after changes … selection of public servants has on senior official employment. We find some evidence for political patronage. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009565331
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Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy
Braendle, Thomas - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum, Universität Basel - 2012
AbstractSenior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity …, political patronage after changes in government, and the selection of public servants into politics affect senior official … patronage. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011152772
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Bureaucrats in parliament : theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany
Brändle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois - 2008
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003891292
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Public servants in parliament : theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany
Stutzer, Alois; Brändle, Thomas - 2009
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of public servants in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003899064
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When the victor cannot claim the spoils : institutional incentives for professionalizing patronage states
Schuster, Christian - 2016
executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory … to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional … design of patronage states. In some, constitutions and budget laws monopolize patronage powers in the executive; in others …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457360
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Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight
Brändle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois - 2010
In this paper, we integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight whereby oversight activities depend on individual control costs and incentives. We focus on public servants selected into parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662480
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Bureaucrats in Parliament: Theory and Evidence on its Determinants in Germany
Braendle, Thomas; Stutzer, Alois - 2008
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390630
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Public servants in parliament: Theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany
Stutzer, Alois; Braendle, Thomas - 2009
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of public servants in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011428802
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Traveling Agents : Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
Iyer, Lakshmi; Mani, Anandi - 2009
We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns as well as the consequences for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047377
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Inequality, infrastructure, and institutions : empirical studies in public economics and political economy
Dorn, Florian - 2021
Florian Dorn erstellte diesen Beitrag während seines Promotionsstudiums an der Universität München (LMU). Die Studie wurde im September 2020 abgeschlossen und von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre als Dissertation angenommen. Die Dissertation trägt zur Empirie der Ökonomie des...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012807266