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You scratch his back, he scratches mine and I’ll scratch yours: Deception in simultaneous cyclic networks
Song, Fei; Zhong, Chen-Bo - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 98-111
themselves. This increased deception may be driven by the anticipation that their lies will be indirectly reciprocated. Indeed …, Study 3 found that deception decreased when the chain of delegations was broken (i.e., A represents B and B represents C …). Moreover, self-report measures suggested that increased deception in simultaneous cyclic network was indeed due to anticipated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263916
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental deception game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 93 (2013), pp. 205-218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198474
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Deception and reciprocity
Alempaki, Despoina; Dogan, Gönül; Saccardo, Silvia - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 22 (2019) 4, pp. 980-1001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012316493
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Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest
Anna E. van 't Veer; Stel, Marielle; Beest, Ilja van - In: Judgment and Decision Making 9 (2014) 3, pp. 199-206
The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010778818
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Control without Deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000
ofoverconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, whichmay explain decay in contributions in repeatedplay designs. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256339
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 205-218
The market for retail financial products (e.g., investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702945
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Truth or Consequences: An Experiment
Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary - In: Management Science 49 (2003) 1, pp. 116-130
reached. We study two decision-elicitation methods: the strategy and the direct response methods. For each method, deception …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191235
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580425
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Social interaction effects in the laboratory and society: Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision
Bardsley, Nicholas; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2003
crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformism, a neglected alternative. The issue is important since …) Conditional Information Lottery design to control 'others' behaviour' without deception. We observe how contributions correlate … reciprocity therefore deserves to be questioned, even in the laboratory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290531
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Control without Deception
Bardsley, Nicholas - 2000
ofoverconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, whichmay explain decay in contributions in repeatedplay designs. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324715