We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...

We study the general problem of public choice. We consider environments where agents’ identities may not be observable. A “rule” associates a preference profile with an alternative. An agent may create fictitious identities and submit multiple preference relations under them. We study...

Regional imbalance of doctors is a serious issue in many countries. In an attempt to average the geographical distribution of doctors, the Japanese government introduced ``regional caps'' recently, restricting the total number of medical residents matched within each region. Motivated by this...

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...

The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared with the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data from Beijing, I investigate parents' behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account parents' possible mistakes...

We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the -core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their...

We consider the problem of allocating m objects to n agents. Each agent has unit demand, and has strict preferences over the objects. There are qj units of object j available and the problem is balanced in the sense that ∑jqj=n. An allocation specifies the amount of each object j that is...

May 1997 (Revised May 1998) <p> By definition, multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms are immune to manipulation not only by individuals misrepresenting their preferences, but also by finite coalitions exchanging tradeable goods on the side. Continuum economies are defined in which both agents'...</p>

We consider the problem of allocating m(m=2) infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. In the two-agents case any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. First, we propose a solution that, in the two-agents case, is the only one that satisfies...

In this paper we propose to analyze the economic problem of allocating tasks on time in order to finish a complex project when information about tasks' duration and predating sequences of tasks is privately owned by the agents that undertake each task. In order to achieve the efficient...