This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is...

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains...

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific...

We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or...

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function...

We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires...

We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price...

Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents'...