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Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies
Dorsch, Michael; Dunz, Karl; Maarek, Paul - In: Public Choice 162 (2015) 3, pp. 381-404
<Para ID="Par1">This paper presents a theory of political instability in autocracies where the disenfranchised express … shocks may trigger costly political action when the autocrat chooses to create rents through regulation that deteriorates the … the magnitude of the effect depends on the extent to which business regulation is market-distorting. Copyright Springer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241859
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Development and inefficient regulation under the threat of revolution
Dorsch, Michael; Dunz, Karl; Maarek, Paul - In: Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the … 44 (2016) 4, pp. 1040-1054
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771222
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Political stability and trade agreements : evidence for "endgame FTAs"
Rotunno, Lorenzo - In: European journal of political economy 45 (2016), pp. 133-148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011715065
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Would you trust lobbies?
Fauvet, Pierre; Rouillon, Sébastien - In: Public choice 167 (2016) 3/4, pp. 201-219
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659079
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Contests : a comparison of timing and information structures
Ludwig, Sandra - 2011
We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124645
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Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
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Resource rents, power, and political stability
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza - 2014
We study the association between resource rents and political stability, highlighting the importance of the distribution of political power as a mediating factor. We present a simple theoretical model showing that increased rents are likely to be positively associated with the stability of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337556
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The economics of politically-connected firms
Choi, Jay Pil (contributor); Thum, Marcel (contributor) - 2008
Political connections between firms and autocratic regimes are not secret and often even publicly displayed in many developing economies. We argue that tying a firm's available rent to a regime’s survival acts as a credible commitment forcing entrepreneurs to support the government and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796265
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The economics of politically-connected firms
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - In: International tax and public finance 16 (2009) 5, pp. 605-620
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929229
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Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states
Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza - In: European journal of political economy 27 (2011) 4, pp. 740-748
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356186