Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 124,010
Cover Image
Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - 2016
We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864825
Cover Image
Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - In: The review of economic studies 84 (2017) 1, pp. 182-236
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746432
Cover Image
A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
Williams, Noah - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 989-1015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549301
Cover Image
Chapter 2. Dynamic Security Design and Corporate Financing*
Sannikov, Yuliy - 2013
microfoundations. The central idea is that firm insiders must retain an appropriate share of firm risk, either to align their …’s assets. Informational problems lead to inevitable inefficiencies—imperfect risk sharing, the possibility of bankruptcy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025562
Cover Image
Dynamic agency and endogenous risk-taking
Wong, Tak-Yuen - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 65 (2019) 9, pp. 4032-4048
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012118536
Cover Image
Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761
Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal … optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620
Cover Image
Evidence of moral hazard in employee performance : an empirical analysis of contract theory
Panicker, Preetha G.; Amudha, R. - In: World review of entrepreneurship, management and … 19 (2023) 1/2, pp. 136-147
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477618
Cover Image
Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020
We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
Cover Image
Chapter 2. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment
Stein, Jeremy C. - 2003
This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023874
Cover Image
Provision of incentives for information acquisition : forecast-based contracts vs. menus of linear contracts
Chen, Fangruo; Lai, Guoming; Xiao, Wenqiang - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 7, pp. 1899-1914
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011518610