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Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games

Shimoji, Makoto - In: International journal of game theory 51 (2022) 3/4, pp. 451-481

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013462918

Setting an exam as an information design problem

Shimoji, Makoto - In: International journal of economic theory 19 (2023) 3, pp. 559-579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335561

Bayesian persuasion by stress test disclosure : conference pape

Gick, Wolfgang; Pausch, Thilo - 2013

This paper argues that stress tests encompassing the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be designed to improve welfare. We develop a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion to show that a banking supervisor can create value when he commits to disclose the stress-testing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339955

A model of belief influence in large social networks

Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 59 (2015) 1, pp. 21-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374030

Bayesian signaling

Hedlund, Jonas - 2014

This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010458265

Bayesian Persuasion

Kamenica, Emir - 2009

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153918

Private Bayesian Persuasion

Arieli, Itai - 2019

We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver. The utility of the sender is a function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903658

Bayesian Persuasion Mediating Cheap Talk

Sagiev, Erkin - 2020

We study a multi-player model of sequential communication. A receiver obtains information from two sources. The first … modifies the initial information. We prove that Bayesian persuasion does not defy truthful communication in cheap talk, but … mitigate utility losses. We also demonstrate that a signalling rule in the persuasion is defined by whether the revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822471

Persuasion by dimension reduction

Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529

Cross-examination

Fluet, Claude; Lanzi, Thomas - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012624866

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