Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
Year of publication: |
January 2017
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Authors: | Hedlund, Jonas |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 167.2017, p. 229-268
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Signaling | Information transmission | Signalling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Kommunikation | Communication | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Manipulation | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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