This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...

This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...

Planner-doer games, introduced in Thaler and Shefrin (1981), are frequently used to model decision-makers with self-control problems. In such games, the planner moves first by making a strategic commitment which partially restricts the doer's choices and the doer follows by making a consumption...

This paper studies a problem of choice under uncertainty in which a decision-maker's (DM) choices randomly map to consumption outcomes. The primitive is a binary relation on menus, where a menu is a set of possible ex post outcomes. After the DM selects a menu, nature (not the DM) makes a...

We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the...

This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...