In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability...

In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...

For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This conuence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Rai¤a, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...

On the domain of two-sided assignment markets, the nucleolus is axiomatized as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency (Owen, 1992) and complaint mono- tonicity on sectors size. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus by means of a strong form of...

We discuss the traditional interpretation of Edgeworth’s conception of competition neo-Walrasian authors developed following the Debreu-Scarf ’s theorem legacy. This interpretation presents Edgeworth as the forerunner of the cooperative-games approach based on the notion of the core as a...

This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its...

Decentralized matching markets on the internet allow large numbers of agents to interact anonymously at virtually no cost. Very little information is available to market participants and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled...

En este trabajo analizamos dos definiciones naturales de convexidad para los juegos de bancarrota, una de ellas fue introducida por Aumann y Maschler (1985). En particular, mostramos que la convexidad, entendida como contribuciones marginales crecientes, no se satisface en el juego presentado...

Although simple games are very useful in modeling decision-making bodies, they allow each voter only two choices: to support or oppose a measure. This restriction ignores that voters often can abstain from voting, which is effectively different from the other two options. Following the approach...

This paper starts from a classical fair division situation of allocating an object among a set of agents. The problem is studied from both a cooperative and a bankruptcy point of view, analyzing the fairness properties of the proposed solutions.