We consider a homogenous good Cournot duopoly, in which a firm owns acost-reducing technology and has a non-controlling share over its rival. Weshow that partial passive ownership holdings may induce licensing via afixed fee and increase consumer surplus, tax revenues, and social...

Researchers around the globe are searching for a "combo-drug" against COVID-19 by trying to combine various existing drugs. Given a set of such drugs, various algorithms (based, for example, on artificial intelligence) are used to identify the efficacy of different shares of the constituent...

We present examples of cost-asymmetric duopoly games where the inefficient firm can obtain higher payoff than its efficient rival. Firms compete in a Cournot fashion and their quantities are chosen by their managers. We assume that managers are offered two types of incentive contracts, the pure...

It is widely believed that vertical integration in an environment without foreclosure, or more generally without any mechanism that restricts competition among firms, raises the welfare of consumers. In this paper we show that this can be overturned in a standard setting. We consider a vertical...

Considering the licensing of a drastic cost-reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly, we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, there are either n - 1 or n optimal licensing policies.

We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that n-1 firms delegate their production decisions and only one firm (the one whose manager is the first mover) does not. The later a manager commits to a quantity, the higher his incentive...