Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the...

Until now most research in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic objective functions because of practical considerations. But in reality, all problems are not quadratic. In this paper, we solve a differential game where players have non-quadratic preferences. In particular we consider an...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are `close' to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are `close' to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply particular...

Local interactions refer to social and economic phenomena where individuals' choices are influenced by the choices of others who are ‘close’ to them socially or geographically. This represents a fairly accurate picture of human experience. Furthermore, since local interactions imply...

The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games is presented as the appropriate tool to model complementarities. The approach, which has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard toolbox of researchers, makes the analysis intuitive and simple, helps in deriving new...

We model a simple dynamic process in which myopic agents are matched amongst each other to play a coordination game. The network of player interaction is varied between a regular lattice and a random network allowing us to model contagion in small world networks. Weighting times for an...

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium...

This paper shows that stochastic search algorithms can be used to compute the perfect and proper equilibria of finite games. These type of equilibria use perturbations as a means of escape from local equilibria. Intuitively, there is always a small probability that an agent will select...

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium...