This paper extends the literature on mixed oligopoly in two directions. First, it introduces distortions in the working of the public firm, an issue that is of some concern, especially in transitional economies. Thus the classical model of mixed oligopoly emerges as a special case of our...

In our model, there are entrepreneurs and other agents. The latter have labour and capital, but no entrepreneurship. They are employed for a wage, or they are self-employed (which is inefficient). If they are employed for a wage, they invest their capital in financial assets. Otherwise, they...

This paper develops a theory of sequential lending in groups in micro-finance that centers on the notion of dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that default incentives should be relatively uniformly distributed across time. In a framework that allows project returns to accrue over...

A partially informed expert, A, strategically transmits information to a principal, P. The residual uncertainty faced by the expert effectively causes the bias between P and A to be random, with two consequences. First, by misreporting A is likely to induce a decision choice by P, after the...

Identity neutral hiring is assessed in an ability signaling model. Assuming some employers wrongly perceive one group, the advantaged with more wealth, to have superior productivity over another (the disadvantaged), identity neutral recruitment improves the disadvantaged group's average wage and...

Sequential advice to a decision maker by two experts, if kept secret from the public, outperforms transparent deliberations. Under secrecy, the prior bias together with the bias due to the lead expert's opinion may or may not generate a conformity bias effect. These effects determine if and when...

This note shows that the most informative equilibrium in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission is almost fully revealing as the two players' preferences get closer to each other. It thus strengthens the original observation that the quality of information does...