We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only … shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design … investigate how limited liability or the threat of sabotage influences the team's problem. It is further shown that players who …

We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses … between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members …, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production …

damage the work climate. We show that both team incentives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate. We …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications. …

provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production … induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications. …