Behavioral agency theory : new foundations for theorizing about executive compensation
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Pepper, Alexander ; Gore, Julie |
Published in: |
Journal of management : JOM. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publ., ISSN 0149-2063, ZDB-ID 83220-0. - Vol. 41.2015, 4, p. 1045-1068
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Subject: | agency theory | behavioral theory | compensation | bonuses and benefits | motivation | top management teams | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Managervergütung | Executive compensation |
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