Thanks to new digital technologies, web users are continuously targeted by offers that potentially fit their interests even if they are not actively looking for a product. Does this matching always promote transactions with high social value? We consider a model in which web users with...

Thanks to new digital technologies, web users are continuously targeted by offers that potentially fit their interests even if they are not actively looking for a product. Does this matching always promote transactions with high social value? We consider a model in which web users with...

This article investigates how a privately-informed seller could signal her type by gathering information about the buyer's match value. We study two alternative ways to obtain information. In the first one, labeled information acquisition, the seller can acquire exogenous signals by facing a...

We present a buyer-seller setup in which seller type is private information and buyer utility is state contingent. States of nature are commonly unknown and the seller can design information through a Bayesian experiment on the state by facing a cost based on Shannon’s entropy. Costly...

We model the choices of a monopolist who faces a partially uninformed population of consumers. She aims at expanding demand by exploiting his (limited) knowledge about consumers’ social network. She offers rewards to current clients in order to induce them to activate their social network and...

In this article the author considers an economy in which individuals are matched into pairs and the desirability of an individual depends on her position on the distribution of wealth. The author assumes that individuals show their relative standing by consuming a conspicuous good and he shows...