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Sensitivity analysis for a dynamic macroeconomic policy game in a monetary union

Blueschke, Dmitri; Blueschke-Nikolaeva, Viktoria; Neck, … - In: Central European journal of operations research 32 (2024) 2, pp. 507-520

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014538854

Limited-tenure concessions for collective goods

Quérou, Nicolas; Tomini, Agnes; Costello, Christopher J. - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 143 (2022), pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013543013

Wait or act now? : learning dynamics in stopping games

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Journal of economic theory 205 (2022), pp. 1-26

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013473022

Strategy adjustments in games with a dynamic public bad : experimental evidence

Pevnitskaya, Svetlana; Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Review of behavioral economics 9 (2022) 2, pp. 173-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013455368

Identification of dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria

Luo, Yao; Xiao, Ping; Xiao, Ruli - In: Journal of econometrics 226 (2022) 2, pp. 343-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013461532

Dynamic advertising games in duopolies under one-step-ahead optimal control

Bhaya, Amit; Kaszkurewicz, Eugenius - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 13 (2023) 3, pp. 721-749

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014327275

An explicit solution to harvesting behaviors in a predator-prey system

Bataille, Guillaume - 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014482841

Subgame-consistent cooperative equilibria of multi-objective dynamic games

Yeung, David W. K.; Petrosjan, Leon A. - In: International game theory review : IGTR 26 (2024) 1, pp. 1-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014490302

A dynamic model of censorship

Sun, Yiman - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 1, pp. 29-60

We study the interaction between an agent of uncertain type, whose project gives rise to both good and bad news, and an evaluator who must decide if and when to fire the agent. The agent can hide bad news from the evaluator at some cost, and will do so if this secures her a significant increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468060

The social equilibrium of relational arrangements

Ghosh, Parikshit; Ray, Debraj - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014375342

A service of the

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