Wait or act now? : learning dynamics in stopping games
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Maestri, Lucas Jóver |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 205.2022, p. 1-26
|
Subject: | Dynamic games | Imperfect monitoring | Reputation dynamics | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Reputation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Lernprozess | Learning process |
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