In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...

Sachzwänge im internationalen Klimaschutz: 1. Weltweit wirksame Begrenzung von Emissionen, 2. Nutzung der Ressource muss einen Preis haben, um Anreiz für sparsamen Umgang zu geben, 3. Pro-Kopf-Lösung (auch von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel gefordert), damit Indien und China mitmachen....

In this paper we analyze how rati cation uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the rati cation stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the pivotal...

We investigate the dynamics of voluntary cooperation to either reduce the size or the probability of stochastic losses. For variants of a repeated four person prisoner’s dilemma game, we show that cooperation is larger and more stable when it affects the probability rather than the size of the...

In this paper we analyze how rati cation uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the rati cation stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the pivotal...