We argue in favor of a departure from the equilibrium approach in game theory towards the less ambitious goal of describing only the actual behavior of rational players. The notions of Nash equilibrium and its refinements require a specification of the players' choices and beliefs not only along...

We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution<br/>concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the<br/>question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.<br/>We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as...

We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (Econometrica 62:783–794, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1994</CitationRef>) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...</citationref>

We prove the generic equivalence between quasi-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Combining this result with Blume and Zame (1994) shows that perfect, quasi-perfect and sequential equilibrium coincide in generic games.