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Kaiser, Jonas Pilgaard; Pedersen, Kasper Selmar; Koch, … - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/75, pp. 1-17

whether to engage in costly punishment of a free rider in a survey-based experiment with 1423 students from seven study areas …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011905088

The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people

Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2020

irrespective of punishment and therefore have a lower demand for a costly punishment institution than groups of like-minded free … riders, who are unable to cooperate without punishment. We also predict that the difference in the demand for punishment is … cooperative groups to avoid wasting resources for an unneeded punishment institution. In uncooperative groups, it helps members to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542999

The demand for punishment to promote cooperation among like-minded people

Bühren, Christoph; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337734

Playing with other people's money: Contributions to public goods by trustees

Makowsky, Michael D.; Orman, Wafa Hakim; Peart, Sandra J. - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 53 (2014) C, pp. 44-55

Decisions about public goods in the real world are frequently made by trustees—individuals responsible for managing pools of contributed funds—rather than by the contributors themselves. We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare contributions made by trustees who play with other trustees...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220542

Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs

Aimone, Jason; Iannaccone, Laurence R.; Makowsky, Michael D. - Department of Economics, Towson University - 2010

How and why do groups form? In many cases, group formation is endogenous to the actions that individual members take and the norms associated with these actions. In this paper, we conduct an experiment that allows groups to form endogenously in the context of the classic voluntary contribution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008455319

A Welfare-Tradeoff-Ratio-Model of Social Preferences

Hartig, Bjoern - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2011

This paper introduces a model of social preferences featuring a single parameter representing an individual's disposition to share resources with others. The parameter reacts to observed behavior of others in a clearly defined manner. Therefore, the model allows the numerical analysis of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321049

A positive theory of cooperative games: The logit core and its variants

Bolle, Friedel; Breitmoser, Yves; Otto, Philipp E. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers and firms negotiate wages and matching). The generalizations proposed allow for social utility components (e.g. altruism) and random utility components (e.g. logistic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251543

On Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games

Germano, Fabrizio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the discontinuities of correspondences of standard equilibrium concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium, or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547401

An experiment on the winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2021

In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793792

The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670