We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

We show that the Copeland solution is equivalent to the minisum principle which requires to choose the candidate(s) who beat all remaining contenders in the smallest total number of steps.

We consider voting games induced by anonymous and top-unanimous social choice functions. The class of such social choice functions is quite broad, including every “t-refinement” of the Plurality Rule, Plurality with a Runoff, the Majoritarian Compromise and the Single Transferable Vote,...

We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives,...

We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is Nash implementable. We show that the plurality rule fails Nash implementability on every domain except those which are "monotonically trivial".