This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining …

This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining …

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative … timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining … outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in period 1 and experience all bargaining payoffs in period 2, the players …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …

I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …

This paper analyzes dynamically inconsistent time preferences in Rubinstein's (1982) seminal model of bargaining. When …-hyperbolic time preferences increasingly common in the economics literature - equilibrium is unique and lacks delay. However, when one … bargainer is more patient about a single period's delay from the present than one that occurs in the near future, the game …