This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly-exogenous declines in...

This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly-exogenous declines in...

This paper examines the consequences of powerful political connections for local governments. We find that governments located within the constituencies of, and thus connected to, powerful congressional members reduce their stewardship over public resources. Using plausibly exogenous declines in...

Do firms strategically use advertising campaigns when subject to the threat of political costs? Communication via advertising can assuage public concerns, which, in turn, reduces the pressure on elected officials to impose political costs on the industry. We identify expected political costs...

Theories of congressional dominance contend that regulatory agencies can be captured by the politicians that oversee them. We examine whether control systems and transparency constrain such capture. Using the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) as a setting, we begin by providing...

This paper examines whether shocks to less visible product market network peers explain industry level post-earnings announcement drift (IPEAD). On the real-side, we find that peer earnings shocks propagate slowly through the peer network, creating a complex and conditional autocorrelation...