Excess returns to producers insured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation can arise due to asymmetric information or from the design of the insurance programs themselves. Using unique, unit-level crop insurance contract data for major crops such as corn, soybeans, and wheat in five growing...

Government programs that help agricultural producers manage risk may have environmental consequences. In recent years, premium subsidies for crop insurance have been increased substantially to encourage greater producer participation. Using detailed, producer-level crop insurance contract data...

Opportunistic behavior in crop insurance can arise due to asymmetric information between producers and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. Producers who insure fields using transitional yields based on county average yields or who select options such as buy-up coverage or revenue insurance...

Transitional yields based on county average can be used by producers as the basis to obtain crop insurance on fields that have not previously produced the crop. Using field-level crop insurance contract data for several crops in five different growing regions we examine the impact of this...

This paper places the modern spread of diet-related chronic disease in the United States within the context of more than a century of innovation in food processing technology, discovery in nutrition science, and corrective policy measures aimed at improving public health. We ask whether the...